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ABSTRACT
Is investing in residential properties located in Rocky Mountain ski resorts a prudent
financial decision? That is the central question this paper will address.
The author examined sales data from almost 3,000 residential transactions in Whitefish,
Montana occurring between 1983 and 2000. Whitefish was chosen partially because this town
exhibits many characteristics typical of Rocky Mountain ski resort towns as well as many of the
non-ski characteristics that affect second home purchases in the Rockies. The author also
gathered tax record information to determine the new number of units constructed during that
period. Other external data, ranging from annual visitors in Glacier National Park to national
economic data, was also collected. This data was examined in conjunction with the appropriate
sales data to determine what factors influence the pricing of residential real estate. Through the
use of a hedonic model, many home-specific variables that commonly influence pricing were
removed, allowing for an "apples-to-apples" comparison within the data set. Utilizing regression
analysis, this data evolved into a representative price index that tracked real property pricing as a
function of time. For the 18 years of data collected, the real price index trended cyclically but
steadily upwards, confirming the existence of a robust property market.
Using the real price index, a system of equations was developed as the foundation for the
econometric model. The New Home Construction Equation (a measure of Supply) and
projections for relevant economic and Demand variables were input into the Real Price Equation
(a measure of inflation-adjusted housing Price) to predict future housing prices. This model
worked very well, with one significant exception. In the detailed analysis comparing price to
housing stock, new supply apparently had a positive affect home prices. This apparent violation
of Supply/Demand principles can be explained by the housing stock itself: Existing stock is
limited and generally outdated, meaning that new stock has little affect on pricing and that
overbuilding risk, at least historically, has not been a factor. There is also the possibility that the
only supply for which significant demand existed was new supply. This will almost certainly
change as the market matures.
Six plausible scenarios of future conditions for the years 2001-2010 were tested using the
model. Three simplistic scenarios were run utilizing linear projections for realistic, pessimistic
and optimistic scenarios to establish the basic understanding of pricing behavior. Three slightly
more complicated scenarios projecting cyclical behavior (more typical of real world conditions)
were then run for realistic, pessimistic and optimistic scenarios to predict a more realistic pricing
pattern. The linear pessimistic case predicted a steady downward trend, while the cyclical
pessimistic case exhibited a flat trend line through its cyclical pricing behavior. All other cases
showed steadily to aggressively upward trends.
This analysis concludes that until new supply begins to lead to a more significant
overbuilding risk, prices in Whitefish will likely continue to escalate in all but a significant,
prolonged downturn in the economy. Another conclusion drawn from the analysis gathered is
that the existing housing stock is outdated and/or in limited supply, leading to an unusual
situation where new supply causes an increase in housing prices.
When compared to resorts in the east, these results proved quite different. Over the same
time period, real pricing for ski condos in New England fell. The author concludes that a
combination of western population growth, greater "four-seasonality" in Rocky Mountain
Resorts and a more disciplined supply market created the conditions permitting real estate
appreciation in the Western US.
These results were explained to individuals throughout the Rockies to assess their
relevance. While the pricing behavior varied somewhat across the region, all individuals
surveyed indicated a significant positive trend in pricing over time. Furthermore, the
explanations regarding the differences between the east and the west were generally agreed upon.
Overall, the consensus was the conclusions taken from this study were generally true across the
region.
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION
Since 1983, the average sales price for a home sold in Whitefish, Montana has risen from
approximately $45,000 to approximately $219,000 in 2000. Adjusted for inflation, the value still
totals $127,000. This appreciation would equate to a compounded return over 18 years of
approximately 9.8% (6.3% minus inflation). This figure is very comparable to long-term stock
market returns. (Home ownership in Whitefish, however, offers the opportunity to ski five
months per year.) Of course, comparing a home built in 1983 to a home built in 2000 is not a
truly fair comparison, given that the average home has certainly changed over this time in terms
of both size and quality. Despite these shortcomings for comparison, this information strongly
suggests a tremendous increase in real estate values over this time period. But are these recent
returns in Whitefish typical in western ski resort towns, or is Whitefish more of an exception
rather than the rule?
CENTRAL QUESTION
Is residential development in Rocky Mountain ski resorts a prudent investment?
APPROACH
Using The Big Mountain Ski and Summer Resort and the adjacent town of Whitefish, Montana
as the primary area of study, this paper will examine the various factors that influence residential
pricing in Rocky Mountain ski resorts. Initially, this study intended to model pricing behavior
for at least two ski areas to examine potential regional trends. Unfortunately, the problems
encountered in gathering data for the other resorts could not be overcome within the relatively
short timeframe of the study. Consequently, the numerical analysis and modeling were
conducted only on The Big Mountain Ski and Summer Resort and the adjacent town of
Whitefish, Montana. Through interviews and surveys with real estate professionals from other
resorts, this report will attempt to determine whether the market trends and characteristics shown
in Whitefish are universal throughout the region or are truly market-specific.
Whitefish was chosen partially because this town exhibits many characteristics typical of Rocky
Mountain ski resort towns (destination resort, consistently good snow, etc.) as well as many of
the non-ski characteristics (golf, fishing, boating, proximity to natural resources, etc.) that affect
second home purchases in the Rockies. Its selection was also due to the author's familiarity with
the area and his access to local individuals capable of aiding in the gathering of sometimes
difficult-to-acquire information. One minor drawback concerning Whitefish is its lack of overall
development. Although the resort has operated since 1947, the resort was only "discovered"
within the last twenty or so years, and even then its discovery by the rich and famous has only
occurred within the last decade. Due to its early stage of development, the results from this
study cannot be directly extrapolated to resorts across the Rockies. However, many resort
characteristics revealed within this study are common throughout the Rockies. More
importantly, the analysis of Whitefish provides useful insight into how a resort market works in
the midst of discovery.
In order to address these issues, the author collected data pertaining to residential sales, new
construction, and various independent and exogenous variables that might possibly influence real
estate demand and pricing. The author also conducted a number of interviews and surveys with
individuals involved in various aspects of resort real estate, ranging from appraisers, sales agents,
resort owners and actual resort developers to obtain the portion of the resort development picture
that cannot be explained purely by numbers.
This paper will be divided into four distinct sections. First, a relevant history of the resort and
town will explain some of the unique characteristics of the subject location. Second, a price
index is created based on historical data that will help identify trends. Next, equations modeling
Supply and Price will be created as the basis for the econometric model. Using this model by
inputting predictions depicting various future economic and demand related trends, the analysis
will reveal likely future pricing behavior under a variety of conditions. Finally, a comparison
between Whitefish and resorts from around the country will help assess the applicability of the
findings outside of Flathead County, Montana.
THE MODEL
The historical data the author collected was analyzed and sorted. Transactions with missing data
or obvious errors were discarded. Utilizing regression analysis on the sales transactions, a
hedonic model was created to account for many home-specific variables that commonly
influence pricing. (A hedonic model is one that is created utilizing only historical data.) This
allowed for an "apples-to-apples" comparison with the typical Whitefish home. This hedonic
model created the representative price index to track real property pricing as a function of time.
Utilizing the real price index, a series of regressions were run to determine which external factors
affected pricing. From these regressions, a system of equations was developed as the foundation
for the econometric model. The New Home Construction Equation (a measure of Supply) as
well as projections for relevant economic and Demand variables were input into the Real Price
Equation (a measure of inflation-adjusted Housing Price) to predict future housing prices.
Various future scenarios were modeled with these equations to determine future pricing behavior
in a variety of socioeconomic conditions.
These results were then discussed with real estate professionals at resorts in New Mexico, Utah,
Colorado and Montana to determine their regional relevance. The modeling results and the
discussions about them were combined to form conclusions about future housing prices in Rocky
Mountain Ski Resorts.
CONCLUSIONS
From this study and analysis, several conclusions will be drawn. First, through construction of
the Real Price Index and comparison with actual sales data, it will be illustrated that real housing
prices have risen in most of the 18 years studied. Through the many modeling scenarios
analyzed on varying future conditions, the paper concludes that price appreciation in Rocky
Mountain Ski Resorts will likely continue in all but the most pessimistic situations. Another
conclusion reached within the confines of this study concerns the supply market: New supply
has a positive affect on real estate pricing. This atypical characteristic could be representative of
resorts markets in the midst of discovery. As a result of these quantitative and qualitative
analyses, the author concludes that the main difference between the general real estate
appreciation at Rocky Mountain Resorts and the more mixed results in the eastern US can be
traced to the changing population patterns, the "four-seasonality," and the more disciplined
supply markets of western resorts.
CHAPTER 2: HISTORICAL AND BACKGROUND INFORMATION
In order to fully understand what factors influence real estate pricing in a particular market, one
needs to understand a little about its history and characteristics.
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Whitefish's location provides an abundance of winter and summer recreational opportunities.
RELEVANT HISTORY OF WHITEFISH
In the early part of the 20th century, Whitefish was a quaint, sleepy collection of tents and
boarding houses abutting Whitefish Lake to serve the lumberjacks, hunters and fisherman that
frequented the area. In 1901, Whitefish was named a transcontinental "division point" on the
Great Northern Railway's "Empire Builder" line traveling from Chicago to Seattle, prompting
the birth of a full-fledged railroad boom town.1 This rail service has been important throughout
the history of Whitefish.
Century Tel Website, Flathead Valley Community Portal, referencing the following books: Henry Elwood -
Kalispell, Montana and the Upper Flathead Valley (1989) and Kathryn McKay - A Pictorial History of the
Flathead Valley, Montana (1997)
GLACIER NATIONAL PARK
In 1911, Whitefish stood poised to capitalize on tourism from the newly formed Glacier National
Park. As the primary stop on the rail line, Whitefish would be the first place from which visitors
to the park traveling by rail would disembark. In the park's early years, however, visitors had no
way to drive through the park. This was a problem considering the automobile's growing
popularity. Consequently, the park's popularity severely lagged that of other National Parks in
the Rockies and diminished the park's importance to surrounding communities as a source of
tourism. Following 11 years of construction, the Going-to-the-Sun Highway opened in 1932,
allowing park visitors to traverse Glacier by car over Logan Pass, prompting a tremendous and
steady increase in park attendance. More importantly, this engineering marvel permitted
Americans to enjoy the park by personal automobile as well as the railway, giving further
legitimacy to Whitefish's growing tourist industry.
Glacier National Park Visitors
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Information courtesy of Glacier National Park. (See Appendicesfor more information.)
RECREATION AND TOURISM
Glacier National Park marked the true beginning of the tourism and recreation that became
increasingly important to Whitefish's economy. In addition to its proximity to Glacier Park,
Whitefish is located about 15 miles north of Flathead Lake, the largest freshwater lake west of
the Mississippi River.2 Whitefish Lake is much smaller and not as subject to the wind and waves
of Flathead Lake, offering a nearby alternative for off-weather days. Consequently, both
Whitefish and Flathead County have long been home to summer boating and fishing enthusiasts.
Although its latitude inspires visions of blustery and frigid winters, Whitefish enjoys relatively
mild temperatures year round. Located at the northern end of the Flathead Valley, Whitefish's
elevation of roughly 3,000 feet above sea level confines the more extreme cold temperatures to
the surrounding peaks. The Village at the base of The Big Mountain (approximately 4,000 feet)
gains just enough altitude to maintain snow levels throughout the Spring Ski Season.
In the 1930's, the locals were able to build a nine-hole golf course and clubhouse using New
Deal funds. Although golf courses were not an acceptable use of New Deal money, the local
golfing community circumvented the regulations by building an "airport" complete with nine
oddly shaped "grass runways" that found use by golfers while waiting for the first plane to land
and a small "hanger," which was used as a pro shop. 3 Nine additional holes were built in the
1950's by the town. Private developers expanded the course to 27 holes in the 1970's and later
to its current 36 holes in the mid 1990's. Golf remains an important activity throughout the
Flathead Valley. Although the season is relatively short compared to warmer climates, its
northern latitude provides plenty of daylight, allowing golfers to start as early as 5:30am and
2 Source: www.rockymtnre.com
3 Personal interview - Tim Grattan
finish well after 10pm in late June. Within the last decade, the Flathead Valley has developed
into an increasingly popular golfing destination.
THE BIG MOUNTAIN
In the early 1930's, Whitefish skiing enthusiasts drove eight rough miles from town to the base
of the Hell Roaring Basin to enjoy the increasingly popular sport of skiing. They would hike
uphill, sometimes for hours on end, ski back down, and repeat this process as many times they
could until they ran out of energy or daylight. The consistent snowfall created nearly ideal
skiing conditions for those bold and energetic enough to endure the hardships. Before long, the
Hell-Roaring Ski Club (sic) had built a cabin for overnight lodging and had installed a rope tow.
In 1936, Averell Harriman, owner of the Union Pacific Railroad, began developing with the
cooperation of the United States Forest Service a destination ski resort served by his rail line in
Sun Valley, Idaho - the first winter sport area on national forest service land.4 Sun Valley
became the jewel of the Northern Rockies in the ski resort universe. The Great Northern
Railway sent their surveyors to the area to find a suitable ski hill to compete. Their first choice,
Heaven's Peak within Glacier Park, required an approval at the Federal level to allow
development. Their permit was denied. Coincidentally, the Whitefish Chamber of Commerce
began courting winter tourism.
A group of local businessmen, hoping to cash in on the success of Sun Valley, looked to utilize
its rail access and proximity to Glacier National Park to generate a significant winter business.
The Big Mountain was born in 1947 when a small group of investors pooled $60,000 in
4 Jean Arthur; Hellroaring - Fifty Years on The Big Mountain; page 17
investment capital and incorporated as Winter Sports, Inc. (Ticker: WSKI.OB) The first year of
operation featured a ski lodge, the old rope tow and a single T-bar lift. They wasted no time in
seeking notoriety for this fledgling ski operation. Despite overwhelming competition, The Big
Mountain won the bid to host the 1949 National Downhill, Slalom and Combined Championship
Ski Races, launching itself into national prominence in the world of downhill skiing.
In the early years, rail was the primary means of travel many skiers used to reach The Big
Mountain, who often came in big groups from Portland, Seattle and Minneapolis. Ski packages
purchased for $89 per person provided a round trip rail ticket, lodging, and skiing for a week.
The resort finally established itself nationally in 1960 when they built a chairlift all the way to
the top. This was a remarkable feat for a locally-owned and established ski resort, considering
the lift was one of the longest in the US. 5
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Although the trend is largely upward, the weakening Canadian Dollar has hurt significantly in the 1990's.
5 Information compiled from interview with Tim Grattan and book by Jean Arthur; Hellroaring - Fifty Years on The
Big Mountain
Despite the best efforts of Winter Sports, Inc., Whitefish has traditionally been more of a
summer destination. In fact, most Rocky Mountain resorts generally attract similar numbers of
summer visitors as they do during the ski season.6 Summer vacationers in the Rockies are
commonly residents of southern states with blazing hot summers who travel in large part to
escape the heat, enjoy colorful mountain views, and participate in activities not available at home
(National Parks and Forests, dude ranches, camping, fishing, etc). This is a stark contrast to New
England, where many summer travelers opt for traditional ocean-front destinations in Maine, on
Cape Cod and the Islands, or small communities on the Rhode Island or Connecticut shore.
Despite good snow conditions on The Big Mountain, Whitefish owes most of its prosperity
throughout the decades to its proximity to Glacier National Park and its wealth of summer
activities.
As second home ownership in resort towns began to take off in the 1970's and 1980's, the
Canadian buyer was particularly important to the ski mountain as well as real estate prices in
Whitefish. At this time, the drinking age in Montana was 19 while the Canadian drinking age
was 21. Much like many Mexican border towns, Whitefish, Montana and The Big Mountain
hosted busload after busload of Canadian youths seeking to ski in a place where they were
legally allowed to purchase and consume alcohol. While Canadian adolescents are not
traditionally a property buyer or second homeowner, they were very influential in a growing
awareness of The Big Mountain among Canadians. Local estimates speculate that roughly half
the skiers on the mountain during this time were Canadian citizens. During that same time, the
Canadian Dollar enjoyed relative strength vs. the US Dollar.
6 Based on multitude of interviews and surveys conducted during this study.
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Consequently, Canadians were among the first to purchase
in Whitefish and on The Big Mountain.
resort property in significant numbers
Within the span of a few years, the Canadian influence on the Whitefish real estate market began
to fade. Just as Montana raised its legal drinking age to 21, Canada reduced theirs, stemming the
flow of adolescents and their families. Furthermore, the strength of the Canadian Dollar began
to wane. Canadians who previously opted to purchase property in Whitefish with relatively
strong Canadian dollars increasingly sought the developing resorts within their own country,
partly for convenience and partly to avoid the instantaneous loss of value from using their
devalued currency. Due to these influential changes occurring over a relatively short period of
time, Canadians virtually disappeared from the Whitefish property market as well as from the ski
scene by the early 1990's.
Fortunately, the diminishing Canadian influence coincided with an influx of emigrants and
buyers from within the US. The 1990's have been tremendous for Whitefish real estate.
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WHITEFISH AND THE BIG MOUNTAIN IN 2001
Whitefish and The Big
CHAIR3Mountain have
prospered in the last
decade, especially the
local real estate market.
Prior to the 1990's, the
resort was just another
ski resort. Although the
resort was over forty
years old and a true four-
season vacation
destination with a wealth
of summer activities, it
AGE MAP remained largely in the
shadows of other resorts. Local boosters and real estate
developers instituted a well-orchestrated marketing
campaign targeted at travel writers and travel agencies
to increase awareness of their largely undiscovered
secret. It worked. Flights began to fill, hotel rooms were empty less often, and restaurants and
small businesses began cropping up to service the increasing number of Whitefish travelers.
Top Left: Big Mountain Road in the heart of the Village. Top right: the newly constructed Kintla Condominiums.
Above: A view of the Village, Whitefish Lake and the adjacent town of Whitefish as seen from the slopes. Most of
the village features ski-in/ski-out capabilities thanks to a network of l'fts and ski runs surrounding the homes.
Local businesses, hotels and developers petitioned the airlines to expand their service even
further with more flights and new cities. As can be seen by the photo and chart below, the
77-
proximity of the airport to the ski mountain and the increasingly positive trend in air travel
illustrate why Glacier International Airport is one of the biggest reasons why Whitefish is
becoming less and less of a secret. Direct flights are currently available from Salt Lake City,
Minneapolis/St. Paul, Seattle and Spokane. Discussions are currently underway to add direct
flights from California's Bay Area, Chicago, Dallas/Ft. Worth and Calgary. Addition of these
routes will certainly bring
continued prosperity to this robust
real estate market.
This rising tide in air travel will
continue to lift all "boats" in the
Whitefish area, bringing the more
time-sensitive and big spending
rich and famous to the area in
increasing numbers. As this occurs, more and more businesses and services will arrive and
evolve, providing new and higher
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residents alike. This in turn encourages not only the rich and famous but also the increasingly
mobile population to consider permanent moves to Whitefish and its wealth of recreational
possibilities.
Nowhere is this trend more evident than in two recent high profile real estate developments by
nationally recognized development companies. Despite a limited supply of competing
developable land, world-class four season recreation capabilities and tremendous value
compared to higher profile resorts, neither of these developments would be feasible if not for the
burgeoning growth in air travel throughout the Flathead Valley and Glacier National Park
Region.
The first of these developments is an ultra high-end private golf community built around a Tom
Fazio designed golf course. In the late 90's, west coast developers Haas and Haynie formed
Discovery Land Company to develop the community a few miles below the ski village
overlooking Whitefish Lake. Single-family lots averaging 2 acres were sold for prices ranging
from $200,000 to over $1,200,000. The development proved extremely successful. The project
sold most of their inventory extremely quickly, despite the fact that the lots did not front on the
golf course. Without a significant metropolitan area nearby, this project obviously would not
have been feasible without good air access.
The latest development signifying the arrival of Whitefish on the national development scene is
Glacier Village (www.glaciervillage.com) at the base of The Big Mountain. Hines Resorts, a
subsidiary of the internationally recognized Houston based Hines, is developing the $300 million
Glacier Village in partnership with Winter Sports, Inc. The aim of this partnership is to
capitalize on the untapped potential of and increasing awareness about the resort and the region
by developing the majority of the remaining base area land into a vibrant pedestrian and ski
friendly village. By the end of this 8-10 year project, approximately 700 new housing units will
populate the highly accessible ski community. Positive trends in air traffic helped ensure the
feasibility of this impressive undertaking.
Left: Hines Resorts'plans for Glacier Village include creating a pedestrian friendly ski village utilizing
underground parking. Most of the new development will occur on land the Birch, Cedar and Dogwood parking lots
currently occupy. Right: Artistic rendering of the freshwater pond located lower part of Glacier Village, one of the
many focal points planned within the development.
With a relatively limited supply of developable land in the immediate Whitefish area, growing
exposure throughout the country and increasing air accessibility, strong potential for escalating
real estate values remains.
CHAPTER 3: REAL ESTATE PRICES
The author accumulated volumes of data in examining this real estate market. Unfortunately,
Montana is a "non-disclosure" state, making it difficult to obtain actual sales figures since they
are not a matter of public record. This makes it complicated to analyze the prices relative to
whatever independent factors may be affecting it. Fortunately, through the local real estate
brokerage association and in conjunction with the cooperation of a few local appraisers and
developers, the author was able to examine actual data for approximately 3,000 residential real
estate transactions occurring in Whitefish since 1983 (the first year data was available).
The average sales price is the logical starting point when looking for trends. The following
graph summarizes the average sales price for all transactions.
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Even adjusted for inflation, the average home sale has increased dramatically between 1983 and 2000.
As one examines the graph, a few things become evident. As indicated by both average price
and number of sales per year, demand for residential real estate was already rising dramatically
at the start of this study in 1983. This is evidence that Whitefish, Montana and The Big
Mountain were well on their way to being "discovered." Despite the national economic
slowdown occurring in the late 1980's and early 1990's, the number of sales and average price
continued to grow. Even adjusted for inflation, the average price increased from approximately
$45,000 to $127,000.
Discovery ultimately meant an onslaught of sales to the rich and famous. Individuals in this
category often are willing to pay more than fair market price for real estate, which can artificially
skew the results upward. One appraiser indicated that for a more accurate picture of real estate
pricing trends that one also had to examine the median home price. Since the median indicates
the "middle" value of home prices, it will not necessarily be as adversely skewed by "above
market" sales. The following chart shows both the nominal and inflation-adjusted median prices
for the Whitefish area. (Average and Median Sales charts courtesy of Kelley Appraisal.)
Adjusted for inflation, the median home price reflects slight upward trends both before and after a spike in 1992.
As expected, the median prices do not escalate as quickly as the average prices, especially once
adjusted for inflation. As with average prices, most of the price escalation occurred from a price
spike in 1992. This temporary boom resulted from a mass migration from recession-plagued
areas such as California. Although the inflation adjusted median prices before and after this
spike are much flatter than the average prices, the median continued to escalate in real terms,
indicating a positive price trend.
Even though actual sales prices are an interesting starting point, too many variables (size,
housing type, skiing/lake access, etc.) exist to rely upon overall sales prices for serious pricing
analysis within the market. Accordingly, the need persists to examine the sales data further to
determine what variables truly affected real estate pricing in the greater Whitefish market.
Nearly 3,000 transactions occurring from January 1983 to December 2000 in Whitefish, the
Village at The Big Mountain, and the areas in between were examined. If key data was missing,
if the sale appeared to be a "non-arm's-length" transaction or if an obvious error existed, the
transaction was excluded. The data contained only actual residential dwellings; no lot sales were
included. Homes built on vacant lots are not integrated until they are resold. Accordingly, many
very high-end transactions are not included in the numerical analysis. Therefore, the resultsfrom
this analysis should be considered conservative. These transactions were sorted and dissected to
examine home-specific relevant factors in residential pricing. Dummy variables were inserted to
account for pricing preferences on everything from water or ski slope frontage, housing type,
parking spaces, and even yearly preferences. The following regression formed the basis for the
representative price index.
Whitefish Price Index Regression
Regression Sum m ary
LO G(PRIC E/SF) vs. 26 In d e pe
Count 2761
Num. Missing 13
R .729
R Squared .532
A djusted R Squared .527
RMS Residual .178
vs. 26 Independents
DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F-V alue P-V alue
26 98.361 3.783 119.426 <.0001
2734 86.607 .032
2760 184.968
Regression Coefficients
LOG(PRIC E/SF) vs. 26 In depende nts
Coefficient Std.Error
Intercept
SF
BEDROOMS
BA THS
W F ISD?
A G E
CONDO?
SKIIN/OUT?
W A TER A CCESS?
PA RKING?
1984
1985
1 986
1987
1 988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1 994
1995
1 996
1997
1 998
1999
2000
Std. Coeff. t-V alue P-Value
1.618 .037 1.618 43.298 <.0001
-4.191 E-5 5.8 85 E-6 -. 108 -7.121 <.0001
-. 002 .001 -. 043 -2.820 .0048
.005 .002 .039 2.538 .0112
.026 .021 .016 1.213 .2251
-. 001 1.094E-4 -. 097 -7.112 <.0001
-. 05 1 .011 -. 072 -4.482 <.0001
.284 .020 .213 14.510 <.0001
.157 .005 .413 29.081 <.0001
.053 .004 .191 12.952 <.0001
.026 .038 .015 .691 .4894
.010 .036 .006 .277 .7820
-. 016 .034 -. 012 -. 474 .6357
-. 025 .035 -. 018 -. 726 .4676
-4.6 7 6 E-7 .034 -3.6 0 9 E-7 -1 .373E-5 >.9999
.043 .033 .038 1.306 .1916
.078 .032 .078 2.410 .0160
.126 .033 .121 3.882 .0001
.228 .032 .239 7.090 <.0001
.260 .033 .236 7.911 <.0001
.302 .033 .2 92 9.265 <.000 1
.255 .033 .241 7.776 <.0001
.264 .033 .229 7.928 <.0001
.306 .033 .279 9.289 <.0001
.294 .033 .291 9.030 <.0001
.327 .032 .346 10.171 <.0001
.335 .032 .381 10.512 <.0001
n d e n ts
F)
ANOVA Table
LOG(PRIC E/S
Re gression
Residual
Total
This regression was utilized to create a representative price index for a "typical" Whitefish
home. Expected values were incorporated into the equation resulting from this regression. This
equation was then tested year-by-year to create a representative price index from 1983 to 2000.
log (price/sf) Expected $/sf Yearly Real expected $/SF
YEAR of typ home 1OA[log(price/sf)] CPI of typ home ('83 dollars)
1983 1.68330241 $ 48.23 99.6 $ 48.42
1984 1.73630241 $ 54.49 103.9 $ 52.44
1985 1.70930241 $ 51.20 107.6 $ 47.59
1986 1.66730241 $ 46.48 109.6 $ 42.41
1987 1.65830241 $ 45.53 113.6 $ 40.08
1988 1.683301942 $ 48.23 118.3 $ 40.77
1989 1.72630241 $ 53.25 124.0 $ 42.94
1990 1.76130241 $ 57.72 130.7 $ 44.16
1991 1.80930241 $ 64.46 136.2 $ 47.33
1992 1.91130241 $ 81.53 140.3 $ 58.11
1993 1.94330241 $ 87.76 144.5 $ 60.73
1994 1.98530241 $ 96.67 148.2 $ 65.23
1995 1.93830241 $ 86.76 152.4 $ 56.93
1996 1.94730241 $ 88.57 156.9 $ 56.45
1997 1.98930241 $ 97.57 160.5 $ 60.79
1998 1.97730241 $ 94.91 163.0 $ 58.23
1999 2.01030241 $ 102.40 166.6 $ 61.46
2000 2.01830241 1$ 104.30 172.2 ,$ 60.57
ted Price/SF
ted for CPI) -+- Real Expected Price/sf ('83 dols)
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The real price index, coupled with the sales data from earlier in the chapter, reveals much about
the transformation of the Whitefish real estate market. Adjusted for inflation, the average price
for a home in Whitefish escalated from roughly $45,000 in 1983 to $127,000 in 2000. Our real
price index in turn escalated from $48.42/SF to $60.57/SF over the same time period. Utilizing
simple math, one can estimate the size of the typical house sold in 1983 at 929 SF, while the
typical house sold in 2000 exploded to 2097 SF. This equates to a 126% increase in the size of
the average home sold. This data strongly suggests that historically, existing stock has been
inadequate for resort buyers and that these buyers are seeking larger units as a whole.
"GOODNESS OF FIT" OF THE FINANCIAL MODEL
This regression yielded a Coefficient of Determination (more commonly known as R2) value of
0.532, indicating that 53.2% of pricing variability can be explained using only these home-
specific variables. For such a complex data set, this is a very good result, indicating a high
degree of confidence in the index. In fact, when regressed against actual pricing data, the index
corresponded at better than 88%, an unusually good fit.
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WHAT DOES THE PRICE INDEX TELL US?
From a pricing perspective, real property values have escalated, but perhaps not to the degree
one might think purely from looking at sales data. Considering the change in size of the typical
home sold, the trend line for real property values on a per square foot basis has escalated from
approximately $43 in 1983 to approximately $62 in 2000, an increase of 44% over 18 years.
This equates to escalation of just over 2% per year above inflation. When examining actual data,
the appreciation in value is even less impressive. From 1983 to 2000, the actual prices escalated
from $48.42/SF to $60.57/SF, an increase of only 25% (just under 1.5% per year above
inflation). If, however, if the figures are examined only between 1987 and 1999, the typical
home would have increased in value by 53% equating to a post-inflationary escalation of over
4% per year. Although the trend is certainly positive, fluctuations throughout each cycle greatly
affect actual performance.
When examining the regression of the LOG (price per square foot) in detail, a few trends
emerge. A slight negative coefficient on the SF (square footage) variable indicates a decreasing
trend, meaning people will pay slightly less for that next incremental square foot in Whitefish.
This matches typical pricing behavior elsewhere. Also of interest is that baths appear to be
slightly more valuable than bedrooms, although neither are overly important in overall pricing.
Whitefish ISD, one of the highest rated school districts in the state, appears to positively affect
pricing. Similarly, the age has a correspondingly negative affect on pricing. These results are
reasonable and match common sense.
Of further interest are the coefficients indicating housing type, slope and water access, and
parking. If a home is a condo (which included townhomes in analyzed sales data), it appears to
have a somewhat significant negative affect. (Remember, this is on a logarithmic scale. $10/sf
=1, $100/sf= 2, $1,000/sf = 3, etc.) All things equal, people will pay less for a condo than they
would for a single-family home of equal size. Conversely, the number of parking spaces seems
to have an identical but positive effect on the property. Of greatest interest, however, are the
coefficients indicating water frontage/access and ski-in/ski-out capabilities. Common sense
suggests that properties with these characteristics will trade at a premium, but this data somewhat
quantifies to what degree that premium exists. Lake front properties appear to trade at a fairly
significant premium to properties without such access, but ski-in/ski-out properties have the
highest positive affect on pricing. Based on the regression table, it appears that the ski-in/ski-out
capability adds roughly 80% more value than water accessibility. (This does not mean that the
properties themselves will necessarily trade at such a premium. This only relates the relative
value of one characteristic to the other.)
This information is particularly useful in quantifying what investments in residential
development yield the highest return. For instance, a developer understanding these
characteristics might conclude that although condominiums trade at a discount to single-family
homes, the ability to construct more ski-in/ski-out condos vs. ski-in/ski-out single-family
dwellings makes a slope-side condo or townhome development a wise investment choice.
Following this analysis, it becomes abundantly clear that the past eighteen years have been
profitable to the Whitefish area real estate community. In order to utilize this information in
modeling future events, one must compare this past pricing behavior with external influences to
understand what variables in the economic environment have the greatest affect on pricing.
Once this relationship is understood, one can make reasonable predictions about the future
behavior of those factors and understand their likely effect on future pricing.
CHAPTER 4: SUPPLY AND DEMAND
The real price index created from historical price data in the previous chapter provides us an
objective overview of past pricing behavior. What external factors were responsible for creating
the real estate environment in which those prices and that behavior emerged? Economics
reminds us that prices are set when supply meets demand. Accordingly, this study looked to
various socioeconomic variables to help determine what factors are important in altering the
housing supply within Whitefish and at resorts throughout the Rockies.
In general the following relationships can be found in any real estate market. As demand for real
estate increases, more buyers enter competition for a supply of real estate that is relatively fixed
over the short run. These buyers then bid up the prices for this existing supply. As prices
escalate, fewer buyers are willing to pay, restoring a temporary equilibrium to the market. Once
prices reach a certain level, however, developers become motivated to create new units of supply
for the market in order to capture the value between what buyers are currently willing to pay and
what the unit can be built for. In theory, an ideal number of units will be built, restoring the
market to equilibrium.
Problems arise when an improper number of units of supply are built for the increased demand,
leaving the market out of equilibrium. If insufficient units are built, too many buyers are chasing
too few units and prices continue to escalate. If too many units are built, supply can easily
exceed the new demand, creating a situation where too few buyers are willing to purchase
property at a certain price point, causing the prices to drop.
In general, real estate investors seek out opportunities where new supply is constrained in some
way, allowing the prices to escalate without a corresponding increase in supply to drive prices
back down. In the Whitefish area, due to the high percentage of state and national forest
designations on the surrounding properties, a limited supply of land exists for new development.
Even if a suitable parcel is available, no guarantees can be made that a new project can be
developed. The city and county have maintained a somewhat restrictive "smart growth"
philosophy regarding zoning and permitting in and around Whitefish. These barriers to future
competing supply were undoubtedly key factors in encouraging developers to proceed.
SUPPLY
Supply is an important factor in any pricing scenario. As a buyer's options increase, the buyer's
urgency as well as the seller's resolve decreases. Understandably, supply is typically one of the
most critical factors in pricing. Since building permit records do not exist back to 1983, tax
records were examined and new construction statistics were manually counted.
The chart shows cyclical construction patterns. Tax-based supply data presumably includes all new housing stock.
When residential pricing exceeds the cost of new construction by a considerable amount, it
provides incentive to developers and contractors to build anew. This is the primary reason new
housing stock is created. Accordingly, it makes sense to understand what was occurring in the
pricing market to spark the new construction detailed in the tax data.
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When examining the new stock vs. the real price index, one can see the two track reasonably
well. Of particular interest is the apparent lack of a negative correlation between new stock and
price. (New stock should increase an individual buyer's options, driving prices down.) This
suggests a number of interesting possibilities, but the most likely is that the existing stock has
historically been so limited and out of date that competition only emerges for newly constructed
units. The exercise in the previous chapter revealing the explosive increase in the size of the
average home supports this theory. If true, this means that in the short term, very little danger
exists of overbuilding, at least if history has any relevance. Obviously, this situation will change
in the future as more new construction occurs, but this is a very interesting observation about the
Whitefish market.
"New Home Construction" is the variable created to track how the market supplies more housing
in response to changing prices. Since it is difficult to track negative adjustments to existing
stock (i.e. demolition), the data set, as well as this new variable, should be considered "gross"
supply/construction. (Demolishing a house and rebuilding on the lot would "net" a zero change
to housing stock, it will register as +1 for this model.) While the net supply and construction
figures would provide a more useful factor in this analysis, the following represents the best data
available. New construction was regressed against the previous year's running total of new
stock, inflation (using the Consumers Price Index) and real residential pricing. The resulting
regression shows a reasonable correlation (R2= .573), meaning that almost 60% of new home
construction can be explained by these three variables.
Real estate has long been considered a "hedge" against inflation, meaning that real estate values
typically escalate in correlation to inflation. Homeowners and investors felt safe by investing
their capital in an asset with security against inflationary change. Furthermore, since the Federal
Reserve Board guards heavily against rampant inflation, inflationary trends heavily influence the
Board's decisions regarding interest rate and banking policy, which in turn have dramatic effects
on the real estate, banking and construction industries. Inflation was viewed as a key factor in
the behavior of the supply within the market and thus included in the equation. Pricing is the
primary driver of most supply markets. Consequently, pricing is expected to be a key factor in
determining how many new units are built each year. Last year's stock is included since supply
is not generally a "random walk;" cyclical behavior indicates a dependence on past results.
Re gress ion Sum m ary
New Home Const vs.3
Count
Num. Missing
R
R Squared
Adjusted R Squared
RMS Residual
ndents
ANOVA Table
New Home Const vs. 3 Independents
Regression
Residual
Total
Regression Coefficients
New Home Const vs. 3 Independents
Coefficient Std. Error
Intercept
Expected Real $/SF
CPI Grow th
Home Const -1
Std. Coeff. t-Value P-Value
-111.808 46.285 -111.808 -2.416 .0300
2.093 .717 .669 2.920 .0112
1281.591 529.522 .511 2.420 .0297
.356 .204 .359 1.744 .1031
This regression forms the basis of an equation that models future changes in supply simply by
plugging in assumptions about future market conditions regarding these two external economic
inputs. This equation will indicate how many units will likely be constructed to compete with
existing supply to meet future demand under the assumed conditions.
DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value P-Value
3 6532.974 2177.658 6.275 .0064
14 4858.637 347.046
17 11391.611
New Construction = -111.808 + (Expected Real Price per SF * 2.093) + (CPI Growth *
1281.591) + (Home Const-1 * 0.356)
In determining which variables had a significant affect on supply, many other data series were
regressed against New Construction. The only combination that included elements that
commonly affect supply and also had a reasonable (>50%) R2 was the regression shown above.
While other combinations had higher R2 's, they neglected key elements necessary for a valid
supply model.
Upon further examination, one can see that the existing stock portion of this equation has a
positive coefficient. This matches the observation made in comparing new construction to
pricing: New construction has a positive effect on prices. (This observation may generally be
true about resorts in the midst of discovery.) While this appears valid in the near term, this
situation cannot endure in the long run. Any unreasonable predictions resulting from this model
can likely be traced directly to this unique and temporary supply situation.
DEMAND
While we can now make reasonable predictions regarding future supply, we must also
understand the accompanying demand to understand where the new price equilibrium will occur.
This leads to an interesting question: What determines "demand" at a ski resort, especially one
with such a wealth of summer activities?
In a survey of real estate professionals from four different western resorts - although answers
varied somewhat from resort to resort - most cited property buyers originating from Texas,
California, Florida, and the Southwestern states. Illinois, New York and the Southeast were also
commonly mentioned. These professionals indicated most buyers are fairly well-to-do
professionals or retirees seeking a mountain retreat and/or retirement home. Many of them
indicated that investment potential/return on investment was a key consideration when buying
resort property. Also, between 10% and 30% (and in one case 60%) of these property buyers are
purchasing the real estate not as vacation or occasional-use property but as their new primary
residence. So how do these people become buyers?
To understand how this information translates into property purchases, one must understand
which demand-related "category" or "categories" of buyers are actually purchasing property in
the market. First inclinations would likely suggest that skiers (as measure by Skier Days) would
be the most appropriate approximation of demand at a ski resort. In other similar studies, Skier
Days/Visits provides a good approximation of demand. (See Chapter 7) Unfortunately, almost
no correlation was found between Skier Days/Visits and pricing in this instance. One could also
argue that the annual visitors to Glacier might be the more valid measure of demand, given the
magnitude of the numbers in comparison. (See page 10). Upon analysis, however, Glacier
Visitors also yield very little correlation to pricing. Perhaps the most compelling argument can
be made for air travel figures. Since people who fly on vacation typically have more money than
those who drive, it stands to reason that enplanements at Glacier International Airport might be
the best measure of demand for real estate pricing. While enplanements correlated better to
pricing than the other two suggested measures of demand, no definitive relationship could be
established.
Since neither Skier Days nor Glacier Visitors nor Airport Enplanements clearly established itself
over the other two, and convincing arguments can be made for all, these were combined into a
single variable - Combined Visitors. This new variable indicates a greater fit than any of the
three individually. As seen in the graph below, "Combined Visitors" is prone to considerable
cycles, but trends upward slightly over time.
Another possible measure of demand is population growth. Outside of the resort world,
population growth is commonly one of the most important contributors to demand. With the
western US growing so rapidly, population growth was also examined for its significance in the
pricing model. Regrettably, annual estimates for Whitefish's population were not readily
available. Such annual estimates for Flathead County, however, were easily accessible. It seems
logical that since Whitefish is the county's most exclusive and prestigious town, county
population figures would not differ drastically from the city figures. Unfortunately, just as with
Combined Skier Days, Glacier Visitors and
Enplanements -+- Combined Visitors
- Linear (Combined Visitors)
2,700,000
2,500,000
2,300,000
2,100,000 +
1,900,000
1,700,000
1,500,000 --
MO qt LC -O 01* ) N- M~ qt U') (D) N'-COM )0CO CO COCO CO C COO) M O) C)))) ) )
visitation, population growth did not correlate well independently as the demand component in
the pricing model.
Population Growth- Flathead County, Montana -E- Population
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Like much of the western US, Flathead County has seen steady growth in recent decades. Source: Census Bureau
As the numerical analysis progressed, it became clear that no singular measure for demand could
be approximated when regressed against the pricing equation; however, Population Growth of
Flathead County and Combined Visitors when used in tandem correlated very well to pricing
behavior.
Unfortunately, in trying to create equations predicting the future behavior of these demand
related variables by regressing them against the same various socioeconomic inputs, no
regression produced logical results that accounted for much better than 40% of behavioral
variability. Rather than create a potentially drastically flawed equation to predict future
Combined Visits and/or Population Growth, reasonable trends will be estimated for these inputs
in the future modeling scenarios.
CHAPTER 5: THE REAL PRICE EQUATION
In order to predict future pricing, one must understand the key variables that affect pricing within
a particular market. In addition to the supply and demand variables discussed in chapter 4, an
array of possible variables and factors exist that may strongly impact residential pricing. While
one can always add additional variables, it does little good to incorporate increasing numbers of
variables into the price equation. While the equation will likely fit reality better, its use as a tool
becomes diminished. Not only do more variables distort the effectiveness of the regression
analysis, but they also require the user to make accurate predictions about the future behavior of
even more independent variables. The ideal pricing equation is one that has the highest R2 while
utilizing the fewest key variables. After dozens of various regressions, the optimal balance
between fit and usability emerged through the following iteration.
Regression Sum m
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Regress ion Coefficie nt
Expected Real $/SF vs. 5
In te rc e p t
Combined V isitors
$ C N/$ U S
G NP G row th
Po p G row th
New Const since 83 -1
s
In d e p e n d e n ts
Coefficient Std. Error Std. Coeff. t-V alue P-V alue
-37.115 14.037 -37.115 -2.644 .0214
1 .378E-5 3.502E-6 .385 3.934 .0020
35.018 7.699 .491 4.548 .0007
43.625 40.640 .089 1.073 .3042
175.353 53.370 .292 3.286 .0065
.013 .003 .475 4.167 .0013
It should be noteworthy that with only these five variables, the model explains roughly 95% of
pricing variability. For this reason, the following simple equation will serve as a highly effective
and usable tool to further analyze the Whitefish real estate market.
Expected Real Price per SF = -37.115 + (Combined Visitors * 0.00001378) + (CN-US
Exchange Rate * 35.018) + (New Const Since 83 -1 * 0.013) + (GNP Growth * 43.625) +
(Population Growth * 175.353)
As stated in the previous chapter on Supply, it is interesting yet again to see a positive correlation
between housing stock and pricing. As discussed before, this suggests the existing stock is
severely limited and/or outdated, presenting a situation in which the only properties "in demand"
are the newly constructed units. Considering that the ski resort celebrated its 5 0 th anniversary in
1997 and that the town has existed in some form or fashion for over 100 years, this scenario
seems quite possible.
Regardless of the current situation, basic economic law states that a positive relationship between
new supply and pricing cannot go on forever. Sooner or later, enough "good" stock will exist to
adversely affect pricing. When that situation occurs, this pricing model becomes obsolete. As
long as the user understands this peculiarity about this real price equation, the model remains
very useful.
FUTURE PRICING SCENARIOS
With the system of equations, one can now make assumptions regarding future conditions and
feed those assumptions into the five independent variables required for the pricing model. From
these equations, the model yields valuable information regarding the behavior of the Whitefish
property market under a variety of future conditions.
CHAPTER 6: SCENARIOS
LINEAR SCENARIOS
This newly created system of equations, coupled with reasonable predictions on the factors listed
below, effectively model future pricing behavior. Simple linear trends allow us to gain a basic
understanding of what is generally likely to occur with realistic, pessimistic and optimistic
assumptions about future conditions.
Linear Realistic Scenario
Expected Combined GNP Population CPI New Home Total Const
Year Real $ISF Visitors Growth Growth Growth $CN/$US Construct since '83
AVG 83-00 $ 52.48 2212337 6.29% 1.95% 3.25% 1.331 61 n/a
TREND'01-'10 formula 0.20% 5.50% 1.50% 3.25% -0.0150 formula formula
1983 $ 48.42 2505030 8.38% 2.29% 2.79% 1.245 69 69
1984 $ 52.44 2207184 11.10% 4.10% 4.32% 1.322 108 177
1985 $ 47.59 1860519 6.81% 2.83% 3.56% 1.399 80 257
1986 $ 42.41 1809337 5.42% 0.18% 1.86% 1.381 14 271
1987 $ 40.08 1931547 6.44% -0.74% 3.65% 1.300 33 304
1988 $ 40.77 2111414 7.79% 0.47% 4.14% 1.193 18 322
1989 $ 42.94 2154671 7.46% 1.44% 4.82% 1.158 32 354
1990 $ 44.16 2329971 5.86% 1.34% 5.40% 1.161 53 407
1991 $ 47.33 2461679 3.06% 2.70% 4.21% 1.156 65 472
1992 $ 58.11 2565528 5.51% 3.26% 3.01% 1.271 96 568
1993 $ 60.73 2522811 5.11% 3.79% 2.99% 1.326 94 662
1994 $ 65.23 2518412 6.07% 3.23% 2.56% 1.403 67 729
1995 $ 56.93 2251398 4.95% 3.27% 2.83% 1.366 67 796
1996 $ 56.45 2083073 5.53% 2.18% 2.95% 1.370 51 847
1997 $ 60.79 2110024 6.31% 1.05% 2.29% 1.429 47 894
1998 $ 58.23 2172176 5.44% 0.20% 1.56% 1.538 54 948
1999 $ 61.46 2055130 5.51% 1.23% 2.21% 1.444 73 1021
2000 $ 60.57 2172164 6.47% 2.33% 3.36% 1.500 72 1093
2001 $ 64.10 2176508 5.50% 1.50% 3.25% 1.485 90 1183
002 $ 64.80 2180861 5.50% 1.50% 3.25% 1.470 97 1280
2003 $ 65.60 2185223 5.50% 1.50% 3.25% 1.455 102 1382
2004 $ 66.46 2189594 5.50% 1.50% 3.25% 1.440 105 1487
2005 $ 67.36 2193973 5.50% 1.50% 3.25% 1.425 108 1595
006 $ 68.30 2198361 5.50% 1.50% 3.25% 1.410 111 1707
2007 $ 69.29 2202757 5.50% 1.50% 3.25% 1.395 115 1821
2008 $ 70.31 2207163 5.50% 1.50% 3.25% 1.380 118 1939
2009 $ 71.38 2211577 5.50% 1.50% 3.25% 1.365 121 2060
2010 $ 72.49 2216000 5.50% 1.50% 3.25% 1.350 125 2185
All of the figures included in the above chart for the years 1983-2000 are actual data and as such
will be consistent throughout the scenarios. Therefore, only the various projections for the years
2001-2010 are shown in subsequent scenarios. Although the calculations are made in 1983
Dollars, the results are also displayed in 2000 dollars for additional clarity.
Linear Realistic Scenario --- Real 1983 Dollars
-n- Real 2000 Dollars
.14 0 --- ------- ----- -- - -
As this scenario shows (using fairly conservative but realistic trends), with consistent GNP
Growth (5.5% annually vs. a 6.3% average), CPI Growth (3.25% vs 3.25% average), Population
Growth (1.5% annually vs. 1.95% average) and clear, consistent trends for both Combined
Visitors (increase by 0.2% annually) and the Canadian exchange rate (drops by .015 $CN/$US
per year) that real prices will continue to increase at a fairly steady rate in coming years.
Once again, by examining the scenario in greater detail, the misaligned relationship between new
construction and pricing becomes increasingly evident. At some point in the future, new
construction will begin to have an increasingly negative effect on pricing, which would skew the
pricing trend downward. Conversely, remember that this pricing model also neglects a large
percentage of the newly constructed high-end single-family homes on vacant lots. Given the
inability to predict which factor is more un-represented by the pricing model, one can rationalize
that they roughly cancel each other out and that the pricing model is still reasonable.
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By assuming a sub-average 5.5% for GNP growth, the author is indicating that the economy over
the past decade has shown a vigor that is not likely to be repeated in the coming decade. Many
economists have indicated that periods of high inflation are less likely in the near future;
therefore, the average of 3.25% CPI growth appears to be on the conservative side given the
current sub 3% performances consistent throughout the 1990's. The population growth figure of
1.5% is also on the conservative side given the average of 1.95% and national trends of
increasing westward emigration. (See next chapter for further discussion on population trends.)
The 0.2% growth in Combined Visitors roughly matches the trend shown in the graph in the last
chapter, and the exchange rate predictions show a gradual strengthening of the Canadian dollar
from its current lows. Despite their linear nature, these predictions are reasonable assumptions.
In the next scenario, the model represents pricing behavior in fairly dismal economic conditions.
Visitors drop at a fairly alarming 3.5% per year, GNP growth is roughly half of what it averaged
over the past 18 years, population grows at an anemic 0.5%, inflation holds steadily and
unwelcome at 4.75% and the strength of the $US dollar drops. (While a strengthening Canadian
dollar in the past has been a good thing, Whitefish is tied to American buyers. Whitefish and
The Big Mountain now face competition from resorts within Canadian borders that are usually
closer to the Canadian property buyer.) While it is unlikely that all these conditions would occur
at once, it is very conceivable that individual conditions could actually be worse than those
depicted. This scenario is intended to show on the worst end of the "reasonable" spectrum of
possibilities.
Linear Pessimistic Scenario
Expected Combined GNP Population CPI New Home Total Const
Year Real $/SF Visitors Growth Growth Growth $CN/$US Construct since '83
AVG 83-00 $ 52.48 2,212,337 6.29% 1.95% 3.25% 1.331 61 n/a
TREND'01-'10 formula -0.035 3.50% 0.50% 4.75% -0.0325 formula formula
2001 $ 59.75 2,096,138 3.50% 0.50% 4.75% 1.467 100 1193
2002 $ 58.90 2,022,773 3.50% 0.50% 4.75% 1.435 108 1301
2003 $ 58.19 1,951,976 3.50% 0.50% 4.75% 1.402 109 1410
004 $ 57.53 1,883,657 3.50% 0.50% 4.75% 1.370 108 1518
2005 $ 56.89 1,817,729 3.50% 0.50% 4.75% 1.337 107 1625
2006 $ 56.27 1,754,109 3.50% 0.50% 4.75% 1.305 105 1730
2007 $ 55.64 1,692,715 3.50% 0.50% 4.75% 1.272 103 1833
008 $ 55.03 1,633,470 3.50% 0.50% 4.75% 1.240 101 1934
2009 $ 54.41 1,576,298 3.50% 0.50% 4.75% 1.207 99 2032
2010 $ 53.80 1,521,128 3.50% 0.50% 4.75% 1.175 97 2129
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Not surprisingly, real prices begin to fall steadily when subjected to such harsh conditions.
When new stock begins to negatively affect pricing, the results from this scenario will be even
worse. This is especially true considering the high-end vacant lot construction will be among the
earliest casualties of such conditions; there will be nothing to offset the negative affect caused by
the adverse stock effect.
Linear Optimistic Scenario
Expected Combined GNP Population CPI New Home Total Const
Year Real $/SF Visitors Growth Growth Growth $CN/$US Construct since '83
AVG 83-00 $ 52.48 2212337 6.29% 1.95% 3.25% 1.331 61 n/a
TREND'01-'10 formula 2.00% 7.50% 2.25% 2.50% 0.0150 formula formula
2001 $ 67.88 2215607 7.50% 2.25% 2.50% 1.515 88 1181
2002 $ 70.16 2259919 7.50% 2.25% 2.50% 1.530 98 1279
2003 $ 72.58 2305118 7.50% 2.25% 2.50% 1.545 107 1386
2004 $ 75.14 2351220 7.50% 2.25% 2.50% 1.560 116 1502
2005 $ 77.81 2398245 7.50% 2.25% 2.50% 1.575 124 1626
2006 $ 80.62 2446209 7.50% 2.25% 2.50% 1.590 133 1760
2007 $ 83.55 2495134 7.50% 2.25% 2.50% 1.605 143 1902
2008 $ 86.61 2545036 7.50% 2.25% 2.50% 1.620 152 2054
2009 $ 89.82 2595937 7.50% 2.25% 2.50% 1.635 162 2217
2010 $ 93.17 2647856 7.50% 2.25% 2.50% 1.650 173 2390
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Rounding out the linear scenarios is the optimistic case. This scenario represents the best end of
the reality spectrum. While this yields a terrific price escalation, these results would also be
tempered by the flurry of building activity once the negative supply/pricing relationship takes
effect. Nonetheless, results anywhere close to this scenario would please any investor.
CYCLICAL SCENARIOS
Although linear scenarios are useful in understanding basic pricing trends under varying
economic conditions, they do not paint a very realistic picture of how the market actually moves.
Rarely do independent variables move in straight lines. In order to more accurately simulate the
real world, the variables were input manually to simulate cyclical behavior for each variable, but
the cycles were created with an overall trend. This cyclical trend is determined separately for the
realistic, pessimistic and optimistic cases. (Trend descriptions ending with a "-" indicate
"slightly." For instance: a trend indicated by "cyc: up -" equates to a cyclic trend with a slightly
upward overall bias.)
The cyclical trend directions were chosen in much the same way the linear cases were chosen -
by making reasonable assumptions about the overall directional behavior occurring in each
scenario. Instead of tracking the trend directly, however, inputs for Combined Visitors, GNP
Growth, Population Growth, CPI Growth and the $CN/$US Exchange Rate are manually input in
cyclical fashion around that trend.
For instance, CPI Growth shows a trend of "cyc: avg." This means that the inputs are manually
inserted in a cyclical fashion about the average; in the realistic scenario shown below, the
average is 3.25%. This means that the inputs will cycle above as well as below the 3.25% in
each individual year, with the cycling generally confined to reasonable bounds above and below
the trend. (In this case, the annual growth never ventures above 4.5% nor below 2.0%.) While
the overall performance generally tracks the linear cases above, the variability possible from year
to year can have significant consequences on an investment, as seen below.
Cyclical Realistic Scenario
Expected Combined GNP Population CPI New Home Total Const
Year Real $/SF Visitors Growth Growth Growth $CN/$US Construct since '83
AVG 83-00 $ 52.48 2,212,337 6.29% 1.95% 3.25% 1.331 61 n/a
TREND -'10 formula cyc: up - cyc: avg cyc: avg cyc: avg cyc: down - formula formula
2001 $ 61.59 2,050,000 4.50% 1.50% 4.00% 1.475 94 1187
2002 $ 62.53 1,950,000 5.00% 2.50% 4.50% 1.450 110 1297
2003 $ 66.47 2,100,000 6.00% 3.50% 3.75% 1.400 115 1412
004 $ 69.58 2,250,000 7.00% 2.00% 3.25% 1.450 116 1528
2005 $ 70.78 2,450,000 6.00% 1.00% 2.75% 1.425 113 1641
2006 $ 66.07 2,200,000 5.75% 0.50% 2.00% 1.375 92 1733
2007 $ 65.68 2,100,000 5.25% 1.50% 2.75% 1.325 94 1827
2008 $ 69.29 2,250,000 6.00% 2.50% 3.25% 1.275 108 1935
2009 $ 76.93 2,400,000 6.50% 3.25% 4.00% 1.350 139 2074
2010 $ 80.17 2,600,000 7.50% 1.75% 3.25% 1.375 147 2221
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The realistic scenario shown above, one can see how the cyclical projections more closely track
the historical performance from 1983 to 2000. Over the long haul, the results are largely the
same; however, the cyclicality produces both boom and bust years along the way. Much like the
real world, even if the overall trend is positive, property buyers can and do lose money if they are
not patient or careful.
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Cyclical Pessimistic Scenario
Expected Combined GNP Population CPI New Home Total Const
Year Real $/SF Visitors Growth Growth Growth $CN/$US Construct since '83
AVG 83-00 $ 52.48 2,212,337 6.29% 1.95% 3.25% 1.331 61 n/a
TREND -'10 formula cyc: down cyc: down cyc: avg cyc: avg cyc: down - formula formula
2001 $ 59.15 2,000,000 4.50% 1.00% 4.00% 1.450 89 1182
2002 $ 56.92 1,850,000 3.50% 1.50% 4.50% 1.400 97 1279
2003 $ 52.06 1,700,000 4.25% 0.50% 5.00% 1.325 96 1374
004 $ 52.99 1,900,000 5.25% 0.00% 4.50% 1.250 91 1465
2005 $ 62.70 2,050,000 6.00% 1.00% 3.75% 1.375 100 1565
2006 $ 62.62 1,950,000 5.00% 1.75% 4.00% 1.350 106 1671
2007 $ 58.73 1,750,000 4.25% 1.00% 3.00% 1.325 87 1758
008 $ 54.73 1,600,000 3.25% 0.50% 4.00% 1.275 85 1843
2009 $ 57.61 1,800,000 4.00% 1.25% 4.25% 1.200 94 1937
2010 $ 55.16 1,550,000 4.50% 0.00% 3.25% 1.250 79 2015
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The pessimistic scenario shown above shows a trend that is largely flat to perhaps a very slight
decrease in real terms. Once again, due to the non-negative relationship between supply and
price within the model, in reality this scenario would fare far worse given a few years of new
construction.
Cyclical Optimistic Scenario
Expected Combined
Year RealI $/SF Visitors
GNP Population
Growth Growth
CPI New Home Total Const
Growth $CN/$US Constrc sie 83
AVG 83-00 $ 52.48 2,212,337 6.29% 1.95% 3.25% 1.331 61 n/a
TREND '-'10 formula cyc: up cyc: up cyc: up cyc: down cyc: flat formula formula
2001 $ 65.44 2,250,000 5.00% 2.00% 3.00% 1.475 89 1182
2002 $ 72.13 2,350,000 6.50% 2.50% 2.50% 1.550 103 1285
2003 $ 80.17 2,550,000 7.50% 3.50% 2.00% 1.600 118 1403
2004 $ 73.29 2,400,000 7.00% 3.00% 3.00% 1.450 122 1526
2005 $ 69.75 2,250,000 6.00% 2.00% 2.75% 1.425 113 1639
2006 $ 75.64 2,500,000 7.25% 1.25% 1.75% 1.475 109 1748
2007 $ 83.40 2,650,000 8.00% 2.50% 2.50% 1.525 134 1881
2008 $ 89.39 2,800,000 7.00% 3.00% 2.75% 1.575 158 2039
2009 $ 85.71 2,550,000 6.75% 3.25% 2.50% 1.500 156 2195
2010 $ 92.24 2,750,000 7.75% 3.50% 2.25% 1.525 166 2361
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The optimistic case depicted above shows spectacular increases in property values. While the
assumptions listed are certainly robust, they represent the high end of reasonable behavior.
However, just as the pessimistic scenario is not truly representative considering the relationship
between supply and price, the same may also be said for the optimistic case. The performance
indicated above will be negatively affected when that troublesome relationship changes.
Despite all the probable future shifts in market behavior, the modeling results forecast excellent
potential for appreciation in all but the most pessimistic market conditions. All else equal, the
expected outcome for all but the cyclical cases still appear to be largely profitable. This bodes
well for would-be developers in the Whitefish area for the foreseeable future.
CHAPTER 7: EAST vs. WEST
In September 2000, MIT Masters Candidate John David Corey studied a similar topic in the
Northeastern US in his thesis, Econometric Model of Ski Condo Prices in New England. He
concluded that for New England, ski condo pricing is almost entirely dependent upon two
primary factors-the economy and skier visits, which in turn are directly affected by the quality
of skiing (as measured by annual snowfall) in that given year. His research concluded that
nominal condo prices have appreciated only slightly or not at all since 1977; however, once
adjusted for inflation, the real prices have fallen nearly 40% in that time. Using a similar model
derived from historical sales figures using economic, demographic and atmospheric inputs and
running several different scenarios, Mr. Corey predicted that over time, New England ski condo
prices (adjusted for inflation) would at best remain stable or actually fall slightly depending on
New England economic and snowfall conditions. Why would the results prove so drastically
different in Whitefish and the Rockies than what was found in New England? There are several
reasons why the situation may be different out west.
Reduction of Second Home Ownership in New England
Across the nation, the number of vacation or recreational homes7 grew by 16% between the 1990
and 2000 census.8 This trend can likely be attributed to baby boomers reaching "empty nest"
status in increasing numbers, prompting the purchase of such property. According to Harry
Dent, Jr., in The Roaring 2000s, generations buy certain types of real estate at certain ages. This
means that typical real estate buying cycles can be tracked by lagging the birth rate a particular
number of years. He cites statistics revealing that most people buy vacation homes between the
7 Comprising any housing units intended for seasonal, recreational or occasional use, including time-share
condominiums.
8 The Burlington Free Press, June 10, 2001; Section B Page 1- Vermont's 2nd Home boom's bust; Nancy Bazilchuk
ages of 42 and 52. This means that the Baby Boom generation would begin buying vacation
homes in 1986 with the peak occurring in 2013. This seems to agree with census data.
The Rockies were at the center of this trend in vacation home ownership. Between the 1990 and
2000 Census, the Mountain West Region (Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New
Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming) saw in increase in vacation home ownership of nearly 33%. New
England, despite its high per capita wealth, saw only a modest 5.6% increase in vacation home
ownership. In particular, New Hampshire and Vermont, home to New England's highest quality
ski resorts and those most comparable to western resorts, actually saw their vacation home
ownership reduce over the same time span. (See chart on next page.) The Burlington Free
Press speculates that a combination of factors is to blame; potential explanations for this trend
include a relatively tight housing market, difficulty of maintaining a second home in a cold
climate, and telecommuters converting second homes to primary residences.9 Nonetheless, the
contrast between regions is remarkable.
This reduction in Vermont and New Hampshire vacation home ownership is remarkable when
considering the robust economic conditions during much of the 1990's. This combination
suggests a drastic difference between New England and the Rockies on ski resort real estate
pricing behavior.
(See Chart next page.)
9 The Vermont Free Press, June 10, 2001; Section B Page 1- Vermont's 2"d Home boom's bust; Nancy Bazilchuk
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,385,975 1,230,479
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Region 331,081 313,411 17,670 5.64% 5,909,695 4,942,714 966,981 19.56%
Mountain West
Arizona 141,916 96,104 45,812 47.67% 2,189,189 1,368,843 820,346 59.93%
Colorado 72,263 63,814 8,449 13.24% 1,808,037 1,282,489 525,548 40.98%
Idaho 27,478 24,252 3,226 13.30% 469,645 360,723 108,922 30.20%
Montana 24,213 20,481 3,732 18.22% 412,633 306,163 106,470 34.78%
Nevada 16,526 11,258 5,268 46.79% 827,457 466,297 361,160 77.45%
New Mexico 31,990 21,862 10,128 46.33% 780,579 542,709 237,870 43.83%
Utah 29,685 21,023 8,662 41.20% 768,594 537,273 231,321 43.05%
Wyoming 12,389 _9468 2,921 30.85% 193,608 168,839 24,769 14.67%
Region 356,460 268,262 88,198 32.88% 7,449,742 5,033,336 2,416,406 48.01%
Montana as a whole did not experience the same phenomenal growth that much of the Mountain
West did. This can be largely attributable to geography and population distribution within the
state. Much like Wyoming to its south, the Rocky Mountain region of Montana occupies the
western portion of the state and comprises far less than half of its area. The eastern portion of
the state, however, is home not only to Montana's larger cities but also its flattest terrain,
resembling the plains of the Midwest and the badlands of the Dakotas. This combination of
factors discounts vacation home growth within the state as a whole. This can be observed in
particular when examining growth on a county-by-county basis. Flathead County, Montana in
particular saw its number of vacation/occasional use homes increase from 2,517 in 1990 to
roughly 3,572 in 2000, an increase of 41.9%.
DESTINATION RESORT VS. WEEKEND DRIVE-UP RESORT
When compared to ski areas in New England and the major western ski resorts, most Rocky
Mountain ski resorts, including The Big Mountain, do not benefit from proximity to major
population centers.
Most New England ski areas are within a reasonably comfortable drive of either Boston or New
York City and rely little on airport accessibility. Although benefiting from the presence of major
airports nearby, resort areas such as Vail and Summit County, Colorado as well as Park City,
Utah are within a few hours of drive of Denver and Salt Lake City respectively. In these cases
as with New England, the "drive-up" market represents a significant portion of skiers as well as
real estate buyers.
Colorado resorts such as Telluride and Aspen as well as Jackson Hole, Wyoming, however, are
more typical of Rocky Mountain ski resorts. Rather than rely upon weekend drive-up traffic for
both lift ticket and real estate sales, they rely upon their proximity to a nearby local commuter
airport that has connections to major airports.
Telluride is at least a seven-hour drive from Denver, but one can fly into the resort by small
commuter aircraft with connections through Denver or Phoenix. Even so, Telluride has seen
some of the country's most explosive growth in real estate prices over the past two decades.
Another classic example is found a few hours east. In the winter, Independence Pass-the major
mountain pass connecting Aspen and Denver/Colorado Springs-is closed, forcing weekend
drivers to detour a considerable distance. This makes a comfortable two-hour summer drive into
a less-convenient four (or more) hours through often-unpredictable winter weather. With direct
flights to and from many major airports, however, Aspen has become accessible year round to its
most important clientele. Jackson Hole is roughly six to eight hours away by car to both Denver
and Salt Lake City, but one can also get short direct flights from not only those cities but also
from Dallas/Ft. Worth. Resorts with good air access stand poised to capitalize on society's
increasing mobility.
With a wealth of attractions and activities, the most significant "drive up" market in the
mountain west comes from the summer tourists driving cross-country. Consequently, most
buyers of Rocky Mountain resort real estate purchase these properties to utilize only a few times
a year, perhaps with the intent of summering there in later, more financially-secure years.
After many interviews and surveys (in addition to much travel over the years), the author has
noticed that western resorts are far more active year round when compared to their counterparts
in the east. When the following question was asked of real estate professionals from four
western ski resorts, "How big of a factor is the summer and its activities in (real estate)
sales/pricing," all of them responded that summer was a significant, or even critical, factor. In
fact, Angel Fire, New Mexico, experiences most of its sales in the summer months.
POPULATION GROWTH
The Rocky Mountain region of the United States is experiencing unprecedented growth.
Beginning in the 1980's, this wave of migration is driven primarily by a burgeoning economy
and revolutionary advances in telecommunications. These factors give citizens not only the
discretionary income to seek a simpler life in areas of the country rich in recreational
opportunities, but also the means to do so without sacrificing the economic opportunities that the
more densely settled areas of the country traditionally offer. This population shift precipitates
greater demand for housing of all types, in theory increasing demand and driving up housing
prices across all housing types. Ski resorts have been most affected.
Perhaps the most fundamental reason for the pricing differences between New England and the
Rockies is the change in market size. While the eight states comprising the Mountain West saw
explosive population growth of 33.0% from 1990 to 2000, the six New England states grew only
5.4%. Real Estate prices across the board appreciate as more real estate consumers arrive,
creating increased demand both for the existing stock of housing and new housing.
Population Growth- New England vs. the Mountain West
2000 1990 Change % Change Rank
New England
Connecticut 3,405,565 3,287,116 118,449 3.60% 47
Maine 1,274,923 1,227,928 46,995 3.83% 46
Massachusetts 6,349,097 6,016,425 332,672 5.53% 41
New Hampshire 1,235,786 1,109,252 126,534 11.41% 22
Rhode Island 1,048,319 1,003,464 44,855 4.47% 45
Vermont 608,827 562,758 46,069 8.19% 38
Regional Total 13,922,517 13,206,943 715,574 5.42%
Mountain West
Arizona 5,130,632 3,665,228 1,465,404 39.98% 2
Colorado 4,301,261 3,294,394 1,006,867 30.56% 3
Idaho 1,293,953 1,006,749 287,204 28.53% 5
Montana 902,195 799,065 103,130 12.91% 20
Nevada 1,998,257 1,201,833 796,424 66.27% 1
New Mexico 1,819,046 1,515,069 303,977 20.06% 12
Utah 2,233,169 1,722,850 510,319 29.62% 4
Wyoming 493,782 453,588 40,194 8.86% 32
Regional Total 18,172,295 13,658,776 4,513,519 33.04%
Over the next 50 years, the western states (including California, Oregon and Washington) are
expected to gain 48 million residents and develop 26 million acres.' 0 Discounting California's
growth (but including Washington and Oregon), approximately 15 million more people will call
the western states home. This suggests continued prosperity for real estate developers in the
region.
Technological advances have accompanied most significant migrations. According to Jack
Lessinger in PENTURBIA - Where Real Estate will Boom AFTER the Crash of Suburbia,
technology is not the cause of these migrations. He speculates that society's desire to improve
its standard of living inspires technology to make the changes necessary to improve living and/or
working conditions. The desire to escape the problems accompanying urbanization led to the
rise of suburbs, automobiles and freeways. As the very problems (traffic, crime, pollution, etc.)
suburbanites sought to escape in moving from the city follow them to suburbia, this is prompting
the next major migration (known as penturbia, or the fifth migration) from the suburbs to smaller
towns and communities throughout the country.
Citing Dr. Lessinger's research, Harry Dent, Jr. makes the following prediction in 1995: "The
powerful confluence of two trends - the next major population migration to small towns and a
rise in vacation home buying by aging baby boomers - will make small resort towns and
recreational areas the premier real estate buys."" In fact, Mr. Dent lists Whitefish, Montana as a
town in the "Innovation Phase," the earliest and most speculative growth phase. (Although it
appears with its "discovery" over the past decade, it may occupy a later phase.) With the
' Denver Post, June 27, 2001; Mega-sprawl ahead; Louis Aguilar
" Dent, Harry Jr. - The Roaring 2000s; Chapter 10, pg 231
dramatic difference in population growth between the two regions, this statement appears to
explain why resort real estate appreciation is occurring in the Rockies but not in New England.
SUPPLY MARKET
In John Corey's thesis on ski condo pricing in New England, he observed that supply markets
responded instantly to changes in price. This means that when prices appreciate above
construction cost, construction activity will immediately engage, almost instantly reducing
prices. He cited that overbuilding in such time was likely further hurting price appreciation.
Whitefish apparently has a more disciplined supply market. Based on the observations about the
uniqueness of Whitefish, the author of this paper was left to contemplate the potential differences
between the regions on construction behavior. While New England resorts apparently have few
barriers permitting new condo supply, western resort towns generally are concerned with more
restrictive growth. These differences could also be explained if New England experiences a
great deal of speculative building and the Rockies practiced a more "build-to-suit" approach. It
is also possible this is merely the difference between the condo market studied in New England
and the entire housing market studied in Whitefish. Based on this author's understanding of the
two regions, a combination of a more build-to-suit approach and the inherent differences
between the condo and general housing supply markets is the most likely explanation.
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS
This paper could not adequately address one of the more interesting phenomena occurring in
Rocky Mountain resort residential real estate-low-density private developments featuring a
variety of community amenities. Exclusive developments such as The Yellowstone Club near
Big Sky, Montana (www.theyellowstoneclub.com), Piano Creek Ranch outside of Pagosa
Springs, Colorado and StockFarm outside of Missoula, Montana offer homeowners/members
facilities ranging from private skiing and golf to customized fishing developments. While
outside the immediate resort boundary in most cases, these developments will affect the market
as a whole. (See Suggested Reading in the Bibliography)
Lastly, development does not occur within a sanitized bubble. In creating residential
development, we impact the community in many ways. While development brings in additional
tax revenue, it also taxes the resources of the town. While development encourages new visitors
and residents to spend more and create economic opportunity for local residents, it also brings
new problems that range from increased automobile traffic and pollution to driving up real estate
prices so the local labor force serving the resort can no longer live nearby. Shortsighted
development can unleash negative influences on both the town and real estate values.
Developers should seek to create projects that maximize profits while minimizing these negative
impacts to the local community and environment, preserving the charm and feel that draw a
homebuyer to purchase in the first place is not destroyed in the process.
CH. 8: CONCLUSIONS
This study examined volumes of economic, demographic and even atmospheric data relating to
the real estate market in Whitefish. After constructing a representative pricing index and model
utilizing a system of equations, it was determined that by assuming future behavior of five
independent inputs and utilizing those assumptions in the model, probable pricing behavior could
be developed. Several scenarios were run to assess that behavior in an array of likely future
conditions. Following the quantitative analysis and qualitative comparisons, several conclusions
may be drawn, both for the Whitefish real estate market as well as Rocky Mountain resorts in
general.
First, through construction of the Real Price Index and comparison with actual sales data, it was
shown that real housing prices in Whitefish have risen in most of the 18 years studied. A
number of interviews with real estate professionals around the region revealed similarly positive
trends. Next, the simulations depicting future conditions predicted in all but the most pessimistic
conditions that real housing prices (adjusted for inflation) will likely continue to rise. In these
pessimistic scenarios, real future-pricing trends remained flat (cyclical) or trended downward
slightly (linear). The realistic cases showed real price appreciation in 2000 dollars starting at
roughly $105/SF in 2001 and by 2010 reaching approximately $125/SF (linear case) and
$139/SF (cyclical case) respectively. The optimistic scenarios yielded some tremendous
appreciation in real prices. Both of the optimistic cases showed escalations from 2001
projections of roughly $105 to $160/SF by 2010. Through the many modeling scenarios
analyzed on varying future conditions, the paper concludes that price appreciation in Rocky
Mountain Ski Resorts will likely continue in all but the most pessimistic situations.
Through this analysis, an interesting conclusion arose about the supply market in Whitefish. An
unusual relationship was detected between construction of new housing and pricing. While new
units generally depress prices in a real estate housing market, the opposite was seen to occur in
Whitefish. (This could be generally true for markets in the midst of discovery.) Because of this
relationship, the model will become obsolete the moment sufficient "new" supply exists. The
results of the scenarios should be examined accordingly.
The final conclusion drawn from the analysis within these pages involves the apparent
differences between eastern and western resort towns. While prices in the Rockies have
appreciated in real terms over the last two decades, prices have fallen by 40% in New England.
This author concludes the main difference between the general real estate appreciation at Rocky
Mountain Resorts and the more mixed results in the eastern US can be traced to changing
population patterns (high growth in the Rockies), the "four-seasonality," and more disciplined
supply markets of western resorts.
The analysis contained within these pages strongly supports the case for continued price
appreciation across the Rocky Mountain Region.
APPENDICES
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Rocky Mountain Real Estate
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Flathead County
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Flathead County Regional Development Office
Kelley Appraisal
US Census Bureau
Bureau of Labor Statistics
Board of Governors - Federal Reserve System
PRICING DATA FROM ANOTHER SMALL ROCKY MOUNTAIN SKI RESORT
I ANGEL FIRE, NEW MEXICO
Condo Sales
Year # Sales Avg Price
1993 84 $41,842
1994 59 $52,423
1995 79 $58,594
1996 71 $62,229
1997 66 $73,780
1998 79 $71,325
1999 64 $79,211
2000 57 $88,347
2001 23 $78,567
Home Sales
Year # Sales
1993 53
1994 69
1995 67
1996 85
1997 80
1998 78
1999 88
2000 76
2001 26
Calculated
Avg $/SF % Change
$41.90 -
$51.22 22.24%
$58.39 14.00%
$63.42 8.61%
$71.30 12.43%
$70.46 -1.18%
$75.84 7.64%
$83.27 9.80%
$77.84 -6.52%
Avg Price Avg $/SF
$127,834 $63.22
$126,838 $62.35
$149,931 $73.52
$161,770 $84.04
$165,057 $86.83
$179,124 $89.95
$198,157 $95.41
$204,877 $103.56
$208,429 $108.13
Calculatei
% Chang
-0.87%
11.17%
10.61%
2.82%
3.16%
5.47%
8.23%
4.41%
Spec Home Sales
Year # Sales Avg Price
1995 3 $236,000
1996 17 $161,453
1997 23 $174,985
1998 17 $172,001
1999 17 $225,810
2000 16 $212,318
2001 4 $257,750
Avg $/SF
$92.06
$95.20
$98.16
$105.58
$102.27
$112.35
$116.02
Calculat
% Chan
Calculated Reported Days
Avg. Size Avg. Size on Mkt.
2564 2,490 451
1696 1,693 146
1783 1,796 176
1629 1,763 230
2208 2,153 258
1890 1,883 174
2222 2,230 264
While the data does not span a similar period of time, the pricing behavior shows real property appreciation.
Furthermore, a premium appears to exist for both single-family housing and new construction. These trends match
those found in Whitefish. Judging from "Days on Market, "product does not sell quickly as a rule of thumb. (Sales
data courtesy of Don Borgeson- Borgi@afweb.com)
Calculated
Avg. Size
999
1023
1003
981
1035
1012
1044
1061
1009
Reported
Avg. Size
Reported
Avg. Size
Days
on Mkt.
389
733
272
309
237
422
385
422
417
Days
on Mkt.
931
670
371
321
234
372
331
472
355
Calculated
Avg. Size
2022
2034
2039
1925
1901
1991
2077
1978
1928
Whitefish Condo Price Index Regression
Regression Sum m a
L o g (Price /S F) vs . 25
Co u n t
N u m . M is s in g
R
R Squared
Adjusted R Squared
R M S Res idual
ry
In d e p e n d e n ts
378
0
.76 0
.57 8
.54 8
.162
A NO V A T ab le
L o g (P rice /S F
R e g re s s io n
R e s id u a I
To ta I
Re g re s s io n
L o g (P rice /S F
In te rc ept
A G E
S F
B EDRO O M S
B A TH S
PA R K IN G ?
B A S E M E N T ?
L A K E?
SLOPE?
1984
1985
1 9 86
1987
1 9 8 8
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1 996
1997
1 998
1999
2000
vs . 25 Independents
DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F-V alue P-V alue
2 5 12.585 .503 19.287 <.0001
352 9.187 .026
377 21.772
C o e ff ic le n ts
) vs . 25 In d e p e n de n ts
Coefficient Std. Erro r S td. Coeff. t-V alue P-V alue
1.653 .163 1.653 10.121 <.0001
-. 0 0 5 .0 0 1 -.1 9 0 -4.5 7 4 <.0 0 0 1
-9.478E-5 2.534E-5 -. 220 -3.740 .0002
-. 011 .014 -. 044 -. 752 .4525
.115 .022 .359 5.238 <.0001
.032 .017 .088 1.854 .0646
.1 2 5 .0 2 0 .2 4 3 6.3 5 0 <.0 0 0 1
.135 .024 .276 5.545 <.0001
.187 .029 .342 6.566 <.0001
.013 .198 .004 .066 .9472
.086 .199 .026 .435 .6640
-. 0 6 0 .1 8 7 -. 0 2 2 -. 3 1 8 .7 5 0 5
-. 220 .171 -. 147 -1.283 .2003
-. 2 2 0 .1 7 8 -. 1 0 5 -1.2 3 6 .2 1 7 2
.026 .167 .022 .155 .8773
.071 .165 .083 .431 .6664
.039 .167 .033 .232 .8168
.252 .165 .270 1.522 .1289
.259 .167 .217 1.551 .1219
.204 .167 .185 1.221 .2229
.049 .165 .054 .299 .7653
.176 .166 .192 1.063 .2884
.181 .165 .224 1.096 .2739
.165 .166 .174 .991 .3223
.187 .164 .266 1.135 .2570
.185 .164 .276 1.126 .2610
)
WHITEFISH CONDO REGRESSION AND PRICING INDEX (NOT A GOOD FIT)
log (price/sf) Expected $/sf Real expected
YEAR of typ home 1OA[log(price/sf)] CPI Price/SF of typ condo
1983 1.8425469$ 69.59 99.6 $ 69.87
1984 1.8555469 $ 71.70 103.9 $ 69.01
1985 1.9285469$ 84.83 107.6 $ 78.84
1986 1.7825469 $ 60.61 109.6 $ 55.30
1987 1.6225469$ 41.93 113.6 $ 36.91
1988 1.6225469$ 41.93 118.3 $ 35.45
1989 1.8685469$ 73.88 124.0 $ 59.58
1990 1.9135469$ 81.95 130.7 $ 62.70
1991 1.8815469$ 76.13 136.2 $ 55.89
1992 2.0945469$ 124.32 140.3 $ 88.61
1993 2.1015469$ 126.34 144.5 $ 87.43
1994 2.0465469$ 111.31 148.2 $ 75.11
1995 1.8915469$ 77.90 152.4 $ 51.12
1996 2.0185469$ 104.36 156.9 $ 66.52
1997 2.0235469$ 105.57 160.5 $ 65.78
1998 2.0075469 $ 101.75 163.0 $ 62.43
1999 2.0295469$ 107.04 166.6 $ 64.25
2000 2.0275469$ 106.55 172.2 $ 61.87
Expected Price/sf -+- Real Expected Price/sf
(adjusted for CPI) - Linear (Real Expected Price/sf)
$100.00 -
$90.00
$80.00
$70.00
$60.00
$50.00
$40.00
$30.00
$20.00
$10.00
IIII II I i I I | | | |
Unfortunately, the small sample size for condos in Whitefish rendered this particular analysis inconclusive. The
results of the exercise are shown above.
ECONOMIC DATA
GROSS NATIONAL PRODUCT
US GROSS NATIONAL
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PRODUCT GROWTH -m-GNP
-+- Annual Growth
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YEAR END AVERAGES - CONSUMER PRICE INDEX
Consumer Price Index 1983-2000 --- CPI
-+-% Change
200.0 - ----
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p A S K C Cb
CPI
YEAR INDEX %CHANGE
1982 96.5 -
1983 99.6 3.21%
1984 103.9 4.32%
1985 107.6 3.56%
1986 109.6 1.86%
1987 113.6 3.65%
1988 118.3 4.14%
1989 124.0 4.82%
1990 130.7 5.40%
1991 136.2 4.21%
1992 140.3 3.01%
1993 144.5 2.99%
1994 148.2 2.56%
1995 152.4 2.83%
1996 156.9 2.95%
1997 160.5 2.29%
1998 163.0 1.56%
1999 166.6 2.21%
2000 172.2 3.36%
2001* 176.6 -
* 1st Half Average
6.00%
5.00%
4.00%
3.00%
2.00%
1.00%
0.00%
YEAR END EXCHANGE RATES
YEAR $CN/$US $US/$CN
1980 1.1945 0.8372
1981 1.1863 0.8430
1982 1.2297 0.8132
1983 1.2445 0.8035
1984 1.3217 0.7566
1985 1.3985 0.7151
1986 1.3810 0.7241
1987 1.3002 0.7691
1988 1.1928 0.8384
1989 1.1580 0.8636
1990 1.1605 0.8617
1991 1.1558 0.8652
1992 1.2714 0.7865
1993 1.3255 0.7544
1994 1.4030 0.7128
1995 1.3655 0.7323
1996 1.3697 0.7301
1997 1.4288 0.6999
1998 1.5375 0.6504
1999 1.4440 0.6925
2000 1.4995 0.6669
US UNEMPLOYMENT INFORMATION
UNEMP
YEAR RATE (avg)
1980 7.18%
1981 7.62%
1982 9.71%
1983 9.60%
1984 7.51%
1985 7.19%
1986 7.00%
1987 6.18%
1988 5.49%
1989 5.26%
1990 5.62%
1991 6.85%
1992 7.49%
1993 6.91%
1994 6.10%
1995 5.59%
1996 5.41%
1997 4.95%
1998 4.51%
1999 4.23%
2000 4.01%
CHANGE
IN RATE
0.44%
2.09%
-0.11%
-2.09%
-0.32%
-0.19%
-0.83%
-0.68%
-0.23%
0.36%
1.23%
0.64%
-0.58%
-0.81%
-0.51%
-0.18%
-0.46%
-0.44%
-0.28%
-0.23%
AVERAGE
EMPLOYMENT
99,303
100,400
99,529
100,822
105,003
107,154
109,601
112,439
114,974
117,327
118,796
117,713
118,488
120,259
123,071
124,908
126,720
129,572
131,471
133,501
135,215
EMPLOYMENT
% CHANGE
1.10%
-0.87%
1.30%
4.15%
2.05%
2.28%
2.59%
2.25%
2.05%
1.25%
-0.91%
0.66%
1.49%
2.34%
1.49%
1.45%
2.25%
1.47%
1.54%
1.28%
National Unemployment Rate --- Unemployment Rate
12.00% - - - - -- -
10.00%
8.00%
6.00%
4.00%
2.00%
0.00%
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REGIONAL DATA
THE BIG MOUNTAIN SKIER DAYS AND PRICING
Season Season Ticket Annual
Beginning Ending Price Skiers
1973 1974 $ 6.50 141,520
1974 1975 $ 6.75 152,112
1975 1976 $ 7.50 167,600
1976 1977 $ 8.00 188,300
1977 1978 $ 8.50 210,662
1978 1979 $ 10.00 213,925
1979 1980 $ 10.50 240,923
1980 1981 $ 11.50 208,470
1981 1982 $ 13.00 239,120
1982 1983 $ 15.00 250,433
1983 1984 $ 16.00 211,142
1984 1985 $ 17.00 227,379
1985 1986 $ 18.00 170,581
1986 1987 $ 18.00 225,640
1987 1988 $ 19.50 236,634
1988 1989 $ 21.00 265,366
1989 1990 $ 25.00 271,884
1990 1991 $ 27.00 288,061
1991 1992 $ 29.00 279,808
1992 1993 $ 30.00 291,554
1993 1994 $ 32.00 263,708
1994 1995 $ 35.00 296,909
1995 1996 $ 38.00 241,156
1996 1997 $ 38.00 270,527
1997 1998 $ 40.00 207,717
1998 1999 $ 40.00 222,353
1999 2000 $ 40.00 285,681
2000 2001 $ 44.00 251,136
Annual Skier Visits
-4--Annual Skiers
350,000 -
300,000
a 250,000
*~200,000
S150,000 *
Uf 100,000
50,000
AIR TRAVEL - GLACIER INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT
Glacier International Airport -
Annual Enplanements
180,000
160,000
2 140,000
120,000
U 100,000
80,000
60,000
40,000
20,000
-+- Commercial
Enplanements
Year Enplanements
1975 25,219
1976 32,758
1977 39,966
1978 45,514
1979 48,183
1980 39,231
1981 36,718
1982 41,391
1983 50,466
1984 49,259
1985 52,520
1986 59,565
1987 45,170
1988 57,047
1989 67,782
1990 71,087
1991 76,652
1992 85,953
1993 89,553
1994 101,715
1995 114,971
1996 121,341
1997 130,620
1998 133,515
1999 146,770
2000 157,850
AID A Aq A q .10 -A
NFJ Nci, N( Nc$, N(>j N(>j N(>Jl Nq, Noj N(>j N N Nle
-
GLACIER NATIONAL PARK (SEE CHART ON PAGE 10)
Year Visitors Year Visitors Year Visitors
1940 177,307 1970 1,241,603
1911 4,000 41 179,082 71 1,303,073
12 6,257 42(3) 63,080 72 1,392,145
13 12,138 43 23,496 73 1,398,958
14 12,168 44 36,192 74(9) 1,406,643
15 13,465 45 67,179 75 1,571,393
16 12,839 46(4) 201,145 76 1,662,678
17 15,050 47 324,396 77 1,656,213
18 (1) 9,086 48 281,562 78 1,601,131
19 18,956 49 478,839 79 1,446,236
1920 22,449 1950 485,950 1980 1,475,538
21 19,736 51 500,125 81 1,786,843
22 23,935 52 630,949 82 1,666,431
23 33,988 53 633,480 83 2,204,131
24 33,372 54 608,230 84 1,946,783
25 40,063 55 674,004 85 1,580,620
26 36,901 56 718,938 86 1,579,191
27 41,745 57(5) 759,161 87 1,660,737
28 53,454 58 706,841 88 1,817,733
29 70,742 59 722,338 89 1,821,523
1930 73,783 1960 724,538 1990 1,987,000
31 59,846 61 739,982 91(10) 2,096,966
32 53,202 62(6) 966,100 92 2,199,767
33 76,615 63 811,214 93 2,141,704
34 116,965 64(7) 642,100 94 2,152,989
35 143,240 65 847,104 95(10) 1,839,518
36 210,072 66 907,839 96 1,720,576
37 194,522 67(8) 884,049 97 1,708,877
38 (2) 153,528 68 964,493 98 1,830,944
39 170,073 69 1,051,165 99 1,686,007
2000 1,728,633
(1) World War I
(2) Changed visitor recording method; actual count only.
(3) Beginning of World War II; travel curtailment.
(4) End of travel curtailment.
(5) US Highway 2 built on S. border of Glacier; all travel through
park.
(6) Seattle World Fair
(7) Park not accessible for two weeks because of flood.
(8) Wildfires in remote areas of park; Going-to-the-Sun Road closed
two weeks.
(9) World Fair in Spokane, WA
(10) Latest opening of Sun Road; emergency repairs due to avalanche
damage.
1/1-5/1
SNOW MEASUREMENTS (in) - HELL ROARING BASIN, MID MOUNTAIN AVG
Observation: Jan. 1
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Observation: Jan. I 72.4
85.4
60.6
90.6
60.6
75.8
66.8
73.7
74.3
61.0
99.0
84.8
74.0
43.8
68.0
67.4
52.8
50.0
72.4
67.0
56.0
70.057.6
50.2
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64.61
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65.6
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